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For the past several decades, Malaysian courts have stood at the 
center of heated debates concerning freedom of religion. 
Conventional accounts trace these tensions to the rise of the dakwah 
(religious revival) movement, which has been the most dynamic 
social and political trend since the late 1970s. According to this 
understanding, legal controversies around religious freedom are the 
result of a clash between competing ideological trends—specifically, 
a standoff between an ascendant religious movement and a liberal 
legal order. In this view, conflict is understood as originating from 
outside the courts. And, framed this way, the question that naturally 
follows is whether the courts have the ability and resolve to uphold 
religious liberty, or if they will succumb to popular political 
pressure.1 This understanding of the root problem (religious revival) 
and what is at stake (liberty) comes effortlessly because it matches 
our taken–for–granted understandings of the role of law and courts in 
defending fundamental liberties and sustaining secularism. 
In general terms, courts are widely understood by scholars, 
practitioners, and the public at large as institutions that resolve 
conflict and safeguard fundamental rights such as freedom of 
religion.2 But this functional understanding precludes deeper insight 
into how and why religious liberty cases continually crop up in the 
 
† Associate Professor and Stephen Jarislowsky Chair, Simon Fraser 
University, Canada. 
1. For an expansive argument along these lines, see generally RAN HIRSCHL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010) (discussing the interface of constitutionalism 
and increased religiosity worldwide); JOSEPH CHINYONG LIOW, PIETY AND 
POLITICS: ISLAMISM IN CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA (2009) (providing an example 
of this framing in relation to Malaysia specifically).  
2. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS  (1986) (explaining the function of courts in various political systems). 
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Malaysian courts. I suggest that far from resolving conflict, the 
judicial system is itself a primary source of tension. Instead of 
resolving legal questions, the judicial system is hard-wired to produce 
legal controversies anew. Rather than simply arbitrating between 
contending parties, courts exacerbated ideological cleavages. And 
instead of assuaging uncertainties, courts in Malaysia repeatedly 
instill a tremendous degree of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and anxiety 
around the meaning and content of “religious freedom.” Ironically, 
law and courts—the very instruments charged with resolving conflict 
and safeguarding rights—repeatedly deliver precisely the opposite 
result. 
Comparative studies from diverse contexts suggest that the 
indeterminacy of freedom of religion is not a uniquely Malaysian 
phenomenon. Although “religious freedom” and “religious liberty” 
typically elicit enthusiastic support whenever they are invoked, they 
are devilishly ambiguous concepts.3 Recent scholarship examines the 
many paradoxes that are embedded in the notion of religious 
freedom, which typically become visible only at the moment when 
law and legal institutions work to define, delimit, and give concrete 
meaning to the term on the ground.4 A first clue that we need to 
search for deeper meaning in the Malaysian context is the fact that 
appeals to religious liberty are invoked by a variety of actors, each 
working at cross-purposes. Claims to religious liberty are made by 
religious minority groups (Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Taoist, 
and heterodox Muslims) vis-à-vis the Muslim majority. But so, too, 
do spokespersons for the Muslim majority deploy “rights talk” vis-à-
vis religious minority groups. And claims to religious freedom are 
not only voiced across communal lines; they are also heard within 
religious communities, as individuals assert the right to religious 
liberty for their own persons, whereas spokespersons of religious 
 
3. This is to some extent a dynamic that is inherent with a broader set of 
fundamental rights. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: 
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 5–9 (1974) (describing what 
he calls a “myth of rights”). 
4. See, e.g., WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM (2005). Additionally, see the work associated with the Politics of 
Religion Freedom project, directed by Peter Danchin, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, 
Saba Mahmood, and Winnifred Sullivan. POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: 
CONTESTED NORMS AND LOCAL PRACTICES, http://politics-of-religious-
freedom.berkeley.edu/ (last visited May 12, 2014). 
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communities simultaneously invoke religious liberty in their claim to 
defend collective norms from state interference.   
Take, for example, the most well-known Malaysian court case, 
Lina Joy v. Religious Council of the Federal Territories,5 which 
lasted for nearly a decade and became a public spectacle at home and 
abroad.6 The case concerned a woman who sought state recognition 
of her religious conversion.7 In litigating Joy’s right to religious 
freedom, her attorneys challenged the personal status laws in force in 
the Federal Territories, which provide no viable avenue for 
conversion out of Islam.8 Joy’s attorneys argued that the laws 
violated her right to religious freedom, a right enshrined in Article 11 
of the Malaysian Constitution, which states (in part) that “Every 
person has the right to profess and practice his religion….”9 But 
Joy’s opponents invoked another clause from the same article, which 
states that “Every religious group has the right…to manage its own 
religious affairs….”10 This second set of attorneys also claimed the 
right to religious freedom, but they argued that Article 11 is meant to 
safeguard the ability of religious communities to craft their own rules 
and regulations (including rules of entry and exit), free from outside 
interference.11   
It is striking that protagonists on both sides of the controversy 
invoked “religious freedom” and that both sides called upon the state 
to secure these alternate visions of religious freedom. The frequency 
of such cases and the repeated appeal for state action by all parties 
suggest that these conundrums are perhaps inevitable whenever states 
attempt to adjudicate between a variety of groups and individuals, 
each of them raising the banner of religious freedom. Nonetheless, it 
is worth exploring whether particular legal arrangements exacerbate 
 
5. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain lain, [2007] 4 
M.L.J. 585 (Malay.), aff’g Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, 
[2004] 2 M.L.J. 119 (Malay.).  
6. See, e.g., Cris Prystay, In Malaysia, a Test for Religious Freedom, WALL ST. 
J. (Aug. 25, 2006), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB115645160096844802. 
7. Lina Joy, [2007] 4 M.L.J. at 592–93. 
8. See id. at 593 (stating that Joy challenged “the constitutionality of the state 
and federal legislations that forbade conversion out of Islam”).  
9. See Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, [2005] 6 M.L.J. 
193, 198 (Malay.) (arguing that Article 11 gave her the freedom to convert to 
Christianity, which was a freedom that could not be restricted by any law). 
10. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor., [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119, 
126 (Malay.). 
11. See id. (finding that there would be “chaos and confusion” if plaintiff did 
not address her renunciation of Islam with the religious authority who has a right to 
manage its own affairs under Article 11(3) prior to her conversion).  
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the frequency and intensity of these sorts of legal dilemmas. In the 
case of Malaysia, two factors are particularly crucial. The first is that 
Malaysia regulates religion far more than most other countries. By 
one measure, Malaysia ranks sixth out of 175 countries worldwide in 
the degree of state regulation of religion.12 As a result, one’s official 
religious status is not a trivial matter—it has legal implications for 
who one can marry, whether or not (and how) one may worship, and 
myriad other rules and regulations. As I show in the analysis that 
follows, such extensive regulation tends to generate its own tensions, 
legal and otherwise. A second institutional factor that exacerbates 
these legal dilemmas is the bifurcation of the Malaysian judicial 
system into “civil” and “shariah” tracks. In theory, these two 
jurisdictions operate independent of one another, with the civil courts 
adjudicating family disputes among non-Muslims and “shariah” 
courts handling family law disputes for Muslims. In practice, 
however, there are cases in which the two jurisdictions collide.   
The case of Shamala v. Jayaganesh13 underlines this problem. 
Shamala and Jayaganesh were married with children when 
Jayaganesh converted to Islam and initiated divorce from his wife.14 
Because husband and wife fell under the jurisdiction of different 
courts following Jayanganesh’s conversion, they each secured 
custody orders from alternate jurisdictions.15 Shamala’s custody order 
came from the civil courts because she fell under civil court 
jurisdiction, whereas Jayanganesh secured his custody order from the 
shariah courts.16 The two court orders came to different conclusions 
about the custody of the children and neither parent was able to 
contest the competing court order as the result of legal standing 
requirements in the civil and shariah courts. As with Lina Joy, 
Shamala produced a political crisis and became a focal point for 
 
12. This is the ranking for 2002 according to the cross-national Government 
Involvement in Religion measure developed by Jonathan Fox. JONATHAN FOX, A 
WORLD SURVEY OF RELIGION AND THE STATE 184 (2008). It should be noted that 
Fox’s study may underestimate the level of regulation in Malaysia, as several 
indicators appear to be miscoded, including the appointment and funding of clergy, 
forced observance, religious education, religious basis of personal status laws and 
restrictions on the publication of religious materials, among others. 
13. Shamala Sathiyaseelan v. Jeyaganesh C. Mogarajah, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 648 
(Malay.). 
14. Id. at 648.  
15. Id. at 653. 
16. Id.  
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competing politicians and civil society groups, each rallying around 
the banner of “religious liberty.” 
In the analysis that follows, I examine Lina Joy and Shamala to 
show that the politics of religious freedom in Malaysia has little to do 
with “religion” and far more to do with the inherent ambiguities of 
religious liberty, coupled with specific institutional features of the 
Malaysian judiciary. Through an examination of the juridification of 
religious law and the institutional development of the Malaysian 
judiciary, I show that the root causes of these controversies are not of 
recent vintage, but rather were set in motion under British colonial 
rule more than a century ago. 
I. A LEGACY OF COLONIALISM: “RACE” AND “RELIGION” AS 
CATEGORIES OF GOVERNANCE 
Malaysia is famously known for its vibrant multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious communities. The ethnic-Malay community is 
overwhelmingly Muslim and constitutes just over half of Malaysia’s 
total population of 30 million.17 The second largest ethnic community 
is Chinese, which stands at approximately 25% of the total 
population.18 Most ethnic-Chinese identify as Buddhist (76%), with 
substantial numbers identifying as Taoist (11%) and Christian 
(10%).19 The third largest ethnic group is Indian and stands at 
approximately 8% of the total population.20 This community is also 
religiously diverse, with most Indian Malaysians following Hinduism 
(85%) and smaller numbers practicing Christianity (7.7%) and Islam 
(3.8%).21 The overall breakdown of the population according to 
religion is approximately 60% Muslim, 19% Buddhist, 9% Christian, 
6% Hindu, and 5% of other faiths. 22   
 
17. See POPULATION PROJECTION, MALAYSIA 2010–2040: SUMMARY 
FINDINGS, DEP’T STATISTICS MALAY. 1, 3, available at 
http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/im 
ages/stories/files/LatestReleases/population/Ringkasan_Penemuan-Sum 
mary_Findings_2010-2040.pdf (last updated Jan. 18, 2013). The ethnic-Malay 
community is legally (indeed constitutionally) defined as Muslim.  MALAY. FED. 
CONST., Nov. 1, 2010, art. 160(2). According to Malaysian state law and official 
census figures, every ethnic-Malay, to a person, is Muslim.  
18. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC 
REPORT 2010, DEP’T STATISTICS MALAY. 5 (2011), available at http://www.statisti 
cs.gov.my/portal/download_Population/files/census2010/Taburan_Penduduk_
dan_Ciri-ciri_Asas_Demografi.pdf. 
19. Id. at 82–98. 
20. Id. at 5.  
21. Id. at 82–98. 
22. Id. at 9. 
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This multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition is largely the 
result of British commercial and colonial domination that began in 
the nineteenth century.23 Laborers were brought from China by the 
hundreds of thousands to work in the tin industry and the British 
turned to India for cheap labor to run vast rubber plantations.24 
Colonial policy tended to overlook the tremendous ethnic and 
linguistic diversity internal to these groupings and economic roles 
were assigned according to “race.”25   
The term “race” may raise eyebrows among some readers. It is 
used here for analytical rather than normative purposes to mark a 
distinct shift in the way that difference was encoded in state law 
beginning in the colonial period as a means to justify the social and 
economic hierarchies that were part and parcel of the colonial project. 
Laura Gomez explains the analytical utility of the term “race” with 
her observation that “both race and ethnicity are about socially 
constructed group difference in society [but] race is always about 
hierarchical social difference….”26 The term “race” thus captures a 
power dimension that tends to fall out of the picture in discussions of 
“ethnicity.” In using the term, it is important to be clear that I 
subscribe to the three components of the constructionist view of race 
outlined by Gomez: (1) a biological basis for race is rejected; (2) race 
is viewed as a social construct that changes along with political, 
 
23. Parts of the Malay Peninsula were multiethnic when British commercial 
interests first arrived on the scene, but economic forces accelerated the rate of 
demographic change.  
24. While most accounts of migration to the Malay Peninsula focus on the 
influx of Chinese and Indian workers, there was also significant Malay migration 
through this period. By 1931, nearly half of Malays in the former protectorates 
“were either first generation arrivals from the Netherlands East Indies or 
descendants of Indonesian migrants who had arrived after 1891.” BARBARA 
ANDAYA & LEONARD ANDAYA, A HISTORY OF MALAYSIA 184 (2001). And just as 
Chinese and Indian migrants were a mix of various ethnic and linguistic groups, the 
“Malay” community was similarly diverse.  
25. Particularly revealing is how census categories merged over time, both 
during the colonial era and after, reflecting (and reinforcing) new political and 
social categories. See Charles Hirschman, The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya: 
Political Economy and Racial Ideology, 1 SOC. F. 330 (1986).  
26. Laura E. Gómez, Understanding Law and Race as Mutually Constitutive: 
An Invitation to Explore an Emerging Field, 6 ANN. R. L. & SOC. SCI. 487, 490 
(2010). 
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economic, and other context; and, (3) “although race is socially 
constructed… [it] has real consequences.”27 
As in other times and places, the legal construction of “race” 
tended to serve economic and political objectives. For example, the 
Malay Reservations Act set land aside for ethnic-Malays to use in 
“traditional” agricultural pursuits, first among them rice cultivation. 
Although the Act was made in the name of preserving “the Malay 
way of life,” its underlying objective was to limit the expansion of 
ethnic-Chinese business interests, to bar ethnic-Malays from 
competing in the lucrative rubber industry, and to preserve adequate 
food supplies in the colony. The official and unofficial basis for the 
legal definition of “Malay” was thus context-specific, but the legal 
category acquired increasing political salience as Malays were 
granted exclusive access to positions in the civil service, special 
business permits, government scholarships, and lucrative government 
contracts under the late colonial administration. The Malay 
Reservations Act defined a Malay as “any person belonging to the 
‘Malayan race’ who habitually spoke Malay … and who professed 
Islam.”28 The racial category of “Malayan” or “Malay” was therefore 
legally fused with the religious designation, “Muslim.” The fused 
racial/religious category, first borne in the colonial era, remains 
virtually unchanged until the present day, as enshrined in Article 
160(2) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution.29 Religious categories 
are thus defined and regulated by state law and thoroughly 
intertwined with the politics of race and access to state resources. 
Often in tacit cooperation or coordination with indigenous elites, 
the British developed personal status laws for the various ethnic and 
religious communities under its control. “Anglo-Hindu law” was 
developed and applied to Hindu subjects; “Chinese customary law” 
was developed and applied to Chinese subjects; and “Anglo-Muslim 
law” was developed and applied to Muslim subjects in matters of 
family law.30 While these legal regimes had some basis in local 
religious and customary norms, codification and application by a 
 
27. Id. at 491. 
28. ANDAYA & ANDAYA, supra note 24, at 183. 
29. Article 160 (2) defines “Malay” as “a person who professes the religion of 
Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, [and] conforms to Malay custom.” 
MALAY. FED. CONST., art. 160 (2). 
30. See generally M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS (1975) (discussing Anglo–Hindu law, 
Chinese customary law, and Anglo–Muslim law in British Malaysia and 
elsewhere). 
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centralized state was a significant departure from local practice. To 
underline this point and provide essential context for the cases 
examined later in this study, it is worth exploring the development of 
“Anglo-Muslim law” in British Malaya in further detail.   
First, it is important to note that to the extent that the Islamic 
legal tradition was practiced in the pre-colonial Malay Peninsula, it 
was socially embedded and marked by tremendous variability across 
time and place.31 Religious leaders were not part of a centralized state 
apparatus.32 Instead, they were “members of village communities 
who, for reasons of exceptional piety or other ability, had been 
chosen by the community to act as imam of the local mosque….”33 
As in other Muslim-majority areas, the colonial period marked a key 
turning point for the institutionalization and centralization of 
religious authority.34 
The British first issued a “Muhammadan Marriage Ordinance” to 
regulate Muslim family law in the Straits Settlements in 1880.35 And 
with British assistance and encouragement, similar Muhammadan 
marriage and divorce enactments went into force in Perak (1885), 
Kedah (1913), Kelantan (1915), and most other states of British 
Malaya. “Anglo-Muslim law” incorporated select fragments of fiqh 
(classical Islamic jurisprudence), but carried epistemological 
assumptions and organizing principles that were based on English 
common law and entirely distinct from usul al-fiqh, the legal method 
 
31. See generally Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur’an and the Common Law: 
Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 
236–37 (1994).  
32. See WILLIAM R. ROFF, THE ORIGINS OF MALAY NATIONALISM 67 (1967) 
(“In the realm of religious belief, as in that of political organization, the Malay state 
as a rule lacked the resources necessary for centralization of authority.”). 
33. Id.  
34. Key studies of this transformation include ROFF, supra note 32; Horowitz, 
supra note 31; M.B. HOOKER, supra note 30. 
35. The British first gained control of port cities for the purpose of trade and 
commerce in Penang (1786), Singapore (1819), and Malacca (1824). Together, the 
three outposts formed the Straits Settlements, which were later ruled directly as a 
formal Crown colony beginning in 1867. Separately, Britain established 
protectorates in what would come to be known as the Federated Malay States of 
Perak, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, and Selangor, and the Unfederated Malay States 
of Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu. By the early twentieth century, 
all of the territory of the Malay Peninsula was brought under similar agreements as 
Britain sought to extend its control and local rulers sought accommodation as a 
means to consolidate their own power vis-à-vis local competitors. 
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undergirding classical Islamic jurisprudence.36 As M.B. Hooker 
explains, “the classical syarî’ah is not the operative law and has not 
been since the colonial period.  ‘Islamic law’ is really Anglo-Muslim 
law; that is, the law that the state makes applicable to Muslims.”37 
The Islamic legal tradition was thus “secularized” in the sense that it 
was formalized, codified, and institutionalized as an instrument of the 
modern state. By the beginning of the twentieth century, “a 
classically-trained Islamic jurist would be at a complete loss with this 
Anglo-Muslim law” whereas “a common lawyer with no knowledge 
of Islam would be perfectly comfortable.”38   
Separate courts for Muslim subjects were established as a 
subordinate part of the judicial system with jurisdiction limited to 
family law matters and rulings subject to appeal before the High 
Courts, which functioned according to English common law. As in its 
other colonial holdings, the British thus shaped the emergence of a 
bifurcated legal system. This bifurcation of the judicial system 
continued after independence in 1957. The federal civil courts 
continued to administer commercial, criminal, and administrative 
law, and personal status law for non-Muslims. State-level Muslim 
Courts (rebranded “Shariah Courts” in 1976) exercised jurisdiction 
over Muslims in the area of personal status law and certain defined 
aspects of criminal law. Shariah court rulings were subject to review 
by the federal civil courts, but the civil courts exercised this 
jurisdiction only on occasion. Nonetheless, the government amended 
the Federal Constitution in 1988 to bar the federal civil courts from 
overturning state level shariah court rulings. Article 121(1A) declared 
that the High Courts of the Federation “shall have no jurisdiction in 
any respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Shariah 
courts.”39 In theory, Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution 
demarcated a clean division between the civil courts and the shariah 
courts. Muslims would henceforth be exclusively subject to the 
jurisdiction of the shariah courts in matters related to religion while 
non-Muslims would remain subject to the jurisdiction of the civil 
 
36. See WAEL HALLAQ, SHARIA: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 
(2009) (providing a comprehensive study of usul al-fiqh and its subversion by 
modern state law); Tamir Moustafa, Judging in God’s Name: State Power, 
Secularism, and the Politics of Islamic Law in Malaysia, 3 OXFORD J.  L. AND 
RELIGION 152 (2014) (examining these developments in contemporary Malaysia). 
37. M.B. Hooker, Introduction: Islamic Law in South–East Asia, 4 AUSTL. J. 
ASIAN L. 213, 218 (2002). 
38. Id. 
39. MALAY. FED. CONST., art. 121 (1A). 
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courts.40 In practice, however, dozens of cases presented vexing legal 
questions.   
II. LINA JOY V. RELIGIOUS COUNCIL OF THE FEDERAL TERRITORIES 
Perhaps the most controversial Malaysian court case of all time 
concerned a Malay woman who sought state recognition of her 
conversion to Christianity so that she could marry a non-Muslim. The 
reader will recall that different personal status laws had been 
developed for various ethnic and religious communities in British 
Malaya. The separate family law regimes for non-Muslim 
communities were repealed and folded into a single Marriage and 
Reform Act in 1976, leaving Muslim family law as the only distinct 
body of family law, institutionally entrenched in state-level Muslim 
courts. These separate jurisdictions for Muslim and non-Muslim 
family law left no official route for marriage between Muslims and 
non-Muslims.41 The only route to marriage was for the non-Muslim 
partner to convert to Islam or for the Muslim partner to change his or 
her legal name. A name change served as a way for star-crossed 
lovers to circumvent the letter of the law because a person’s religion 
was simply assumed by the legally registered name. 
In 1997, the woman who would eventually come to be known as 
Lina Joy applied to change her name from Azlina bte Jailani (a 
Muslim name) to Lina Lelani (a non-Muslim name) so that she could 
enter into marriage with her non-Muslim partner.42 However, the 
administrative unit charged with processing such requests, the 
National Registration Department (NRD), rejected her application.43 
Azlina filed a second application, this time to change the name on her 
National Identity Card to “Lina Joy.”44 The National Registration 
Department approved the second request, but Joy’s replacement 
 
40. Schedule Nine of the Federal Constitution sets out the areas of law that fall 
within the jurisdiction of state-level shariah courts. Id.  
41. It should be observed that these legal restrictions do not conform to 
classical Islamic jurisprudence, which holds that marriage between a Muslim man 
and a non-Muslim woman (Christian or Jewish) is permissible. It is the bifurcated 
structure of the legal system rather than religious prohibition that is the source of 
tension.  
42. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain, [2007] 
4 M.L.J. 585, 592 (Malay.). 
43. Id. (providing no reason for the rejection of her application). 
44. Id. She explained in both applications that she had converted to 
Christianity and that she intended to marry a Christian man. Id. at 593. It is likely 
that this statement raised alarms among those in the NRD.  
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identity card now recorded her official religion as “Islam.”45 The 
statement of official religion was the result of a new administrative 
procedure designed to close the loophole that had enabled Muslims to 
effectively sidestep the state’s regulation of religion by way of a 
name change.46 Lina Joy filed a third application, this time to remove 
the word “Islam” from her identity card, but the NRD refused to 
accept her application without certification from a shariah court that 
she was no longer a Muslim.47    
Joy chose not to pursue this avenue because it had been an 
administrative dead-end for others before her.48 Instead, Joy initiated 
a lawsuit against the National Registration Department and the 
Religious Council of the Federal Territories.49 Joy’s attorney, 
Benjamin Dawson, pointed to Article 11(1) of the Malaysian 
Constitution, which states, “Every person has the right to profess and 
practice his religion….” Dawson argued that Article 11 gave Joy 
alone the freedom to declare her religion and that she had no 
obligation to seek certification from a third party.50 The counsel for 
the government argued that the court should dismiss the petition 
because conversion out of Islam was a legal matter that lay within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the shariah courts as opposed to the civil 
courts. They argued that Article 121(1A) clearly provided that the 
civil courts “shall have no jurisdiction in any respect of any matter 
within the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts.”51 
 
45. Id. at 593.  
46. P.U. (A) 70/2000 came into force retroactively on Oct. 1, 1999. Id. 
Although it is impossible to know with certainty, the timing of the rule change and 
their retroactive effect suggests that these regulations were issued as a direct result 
of Lina Joy’s application, and that the new regulations were intended to close the 
loophole that had enabled conversion by way of name change.  
47. Id.  
48. See, e.g., Soon Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) 
Kedah & Anor [1994] 1 M.L.J. 690, 693–94 (Malay.) (holding that plaintiff was 
still a Muslim until a declaration was made by a shariah court that he was not); Md 
Hakim Lee v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala Lumpur, [1998] 1 
M.L.J. 681 (Malay.). 
49. Lina Joy, [2007] 4 M.L.J. at 593.  
50. Joy’s attorneys challenged the constitutionality of Article 2 of the 
Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act of 1993 and related state 
enactments.  They also claimed that the Shariah Criminal Offences Act of 1997 and 
related State Enactments were not applicable to the plaintiff who was now a 
Christian. Id.  
51. MALAY. FED. CONST. art. 121(1A). 
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Relying on court precedent, Judge Faiza Tamby Chik agreed that 
the matter lay within the jurisdiction of the shariah courts.52 
Furthermore, he addressed the constitutional provisions on freedom 
of religion, explaining that Joy’s fundamental freedoms were not 
violated if one understands that the true intent of Article 11 is to 
protect the freedom of religious communities rather than for 
individuals to profess and practice the religion of their choice.53 To 
support this interpretation, Judge Tamby Chik pointed to other 
clauses in Article 11 of the Federal Constitution, including clause 3, 
which states: “Every religious group has the right…to manage its 
own religious affairs….”54 The true meaning of freedom of religion, 
the judge explained, is that religious authorities should be left to 
regulate their own internal matters without outside interference.55  
Judge Tamby Chik explained in his ruling that: 
When a Muslim wishes to renounce/leave the religion 
of Islam, his other rights and obligations as a Muslim 
will also be jeopardized and this is an affair of Muslim 
[sic] falling under the first defendant’s jurisdiction…. 
Even though the first part [of article 11] provides that 
every person has the right to profess and practice his 
religion, this does not mean that the plaintiff can hide 
behind this provision without first settling the issue of 
renunciation of her religion (Islam) with the religious 
 
52. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119, 
129. (Malay.) (“Her purported renunciation of Islam can only be determined by the 
Shariah Courts and not the Civil Courts pursuant to art. 121(1A).”).  
53. See id. at 133 (stating that Article 11 was “created for the harmony and 
well-being of the multi-racial and multi-religious communities of this country”). 
This decision departed from earlier rulings by the civil courts in Ng Wan Chan v. 
Islamic Religious Council of the Federal Territories, [1991] 3 M.L.J. 487 (Malay.) 
and Dalip Kaur v. Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam, 
[1992] 1 M.L.J. 1 (Malay.). In both cases, the civil courts took the position that 
only issues expressly conferred to the jurisdiction of the shariah courts would 
remain in their jurisdiction. Lina Joy, [2004] 2 M.L.J. at 133. This principle 
changed just prior to Lina Joy in a decision involving a Sikh man (Soon Singh) 
who wished to change his religious designation after having converted to Islam as a 
teenager. Soon Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim) Kedah, 
[1994] 1 M.L.J. 690 (Malay.). In this case, the civil courts adopted a new doctrine 
of implied jurisdiction vis-à-vis the shariah courts, effectively providing the shariah 
courts with exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. Id. at 693.  
54. Lina Joy, [2004] 2 M.L.J. at 126 (citing MALAY. FED. CONST. art. 
11(3)(a)).  
55. Id. at 126.   
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authority which has the right to manage its own 
religious affairs under art 11 (3) (a) of the FC.56 
What is most striking for our purpose is the fact that “freedom of 
religion” was invoked by advocates on both sides of this legal 
struggle. Joy and her supporters insisted on her right to individual 
religious freedom while her opponents insisted on religious liberty of 
another sort: freedom of the Muslim community to maintain its own 
norms (including rules of entry and exit) without state interference. 
Having lost the battle in the High Court, Joy’s attorneys changed 
their strategy and focused on the narrow administrative question of 
whether the Director General of the National Registration 
Department had overstepped his bounds by requiring certification 
from a Shariah Court.57 It did not go unnoticed that the 2-1 split 
decision mirrored the emerging religious divide in Malaysian society. 
Two Muslim justices, Abdul Aziz Mohamad and Arifin Zakaria, 
wrote the majority opinion while Gopal Sri Ram, a non-Muslim, 
wrote the dissenting opinion.58 Judges Abdul Aziz Mohamad and 
Arifin Zakaria took the position that whether or not a person had 
renounced Islam is “a question of Islamic law that was not within the 
jurisdiction of the NRD and that the NRD was not equipped or 
qualified to decide.”59 The dissenting judgment from Judge Gopal Sri 
Ram took the position that “an order or certificate from the Syariah 
Court was not a relevant document for the processing of the 
appellant’s application. It was not a document prescribed by the 1990 
Regulations.”60 Judge Sri Ram concluded that, “[w]here a public 
decision-maker takes extraneous matters into account, his or her 
decision is null and void and of no effect.”61   
Having lost in the Court of Appeal, Joy and her attorneys had 
one final opportunity in the highest appellate court, the Federal Court 
of Malaysia. Watching briefs were held by NGOs on both sides of the 
case. The Bar Council, the National Human Rights Society 
(HAKAM), and the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, 
Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism held watching briefs on behalf 
of Lina Joy, while conservative Muslim organizations submitted 
 
56. Id. at 125. 
57. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, [2005] 6 M.L.J. 
193, 199 (Malay.).  
58. Id. at 198, 214. 
59. Id. at 208–09. 
60. Id. at 219 (Gopal Sri Ram, J., dissenting). 
61. Id. at 220. 
494 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:481 
 
 
watching briefs of their own.62  In a 2-1 split decision, the 53-page 
ruling reproduced the same fault lines that were present in the Court 
of Appeal.63 Chief Justice Ahmad Fairuz and Justice Alauddin 
presented a technical rationale for the NRD’s actions.64 The 
dissenting judgment from Richard Malanjum, on the other hand, 
pointed once again to the glaring lacuna in the law: “The insistence 
by NRD for a certificate of apostasy from the Federal Territory 
Syariah Court or any Islamic Authority was not only illegal but 
unreasonable. This was because under the applicable law, the Syariah 
Court in the Federal Territory has no statutory power to adjudicate on 
the issue of apostasy.”65 In other words, there was a lacuna in the law. 
Judge Malanjum explained that, regardless of this lacuna in the law, 
in such a situation the federal courts have a constitutional duty to 
protect fundamental rights, regardless of Article 121(1A):  
Since constitutional issues are involved especially on 
the question of fundamental rights as enshrined in the 
Constitution, it is of critical importance that the civil 
superior courts should not decline jurisdiction by 
merely citing art 121 (1A).  The article only protects 
the Shariah Court in matters within their jurisdiction, 
which does not include interpretation of the provisions 
of the Constitution.  Hence, when jurisdictional issues 
arise civil courts are not required to abdicate their 
constitutional function.  Legislation criminalizing 
apostasy or limiting the scope of fundamental 
liberties…are constitutional issues in nature which 
only the civil courts have jurisdiction to determine.66 
By failing to address these issues head on, the majority decision 
in Lina Joy did little to address the underlying legal conundrums that 
lay at the heart of all prior conversion cases. Lina Joy was a painful 
reminder that the Malaysian judicial system was hard-wired to 
produce these sorts of legal tensions.   
 
62. See Tamir Moustafa, Liberal Rights Versus Islamic Law? The Construction 
of a Binary in Malaysian Politics, 47 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 771, 776–77, 783 (2013). 
63. Lina Joy lwn v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain, 
[2007] 4 M.L.J. 585, 594, 596 (Malay.). 
64. See id. at 594–96. 
65. Id. at 598 (Malanjum, C.J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 597–98. 
2014] THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN MALAYSIA     495 
The case followed a similar fact pattern to many other 
conversion cases that preceded it, but carried one unique aspect: Joy 
was an ethnic Malay, whereas all prior conversion cases concerned 
non-Malays who had converted to Islam and subsequently sought to 
change their religious status back to their original faith. Lina Joy’s 
case thus exposed a racial dimension in the equation. As part of its 
ruling, the court relied on Article 160 of the Federal Constitution, 
which defines Malay as “a person who professes the religion of 
Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, [and] conforms to 
Malay custom….”67 Citing Article 160, the Court explained that Lina 
Joy’s “race” carried legal consequences that could not be abandoned:   
In her affidavit affirmed on 8 May 2000, the plaintiff 
stated that her father is a Malay.  His name is Jailani 
bin Shariff.  All his life, the father has been professing 
and practising the Islamic religion.  So is the mother.  
Her name is Kalthum bte Omar, a Malay.  Both of the 
parents are still professing and practising the Islamic 
religion.  And being Malays they habitually speaks the 
Malay language and conform to Malay custom.  The 
plaintiff also stated that she is raised, and grew up in a 
household of Islamic belief although her belief in 
Islam is shallow.  In exh C, she stated that her original 
name is Azlina bte Jailani as is stated in her I/C No 
7220456.  I therefore conclude that the plaintiff is a 
Malay.  By art 160 of the FC, the plaintiff is a Malay 
and therefore as long as she is a Malay by that 
definition she cannot renounce her Islamic religion at 
all.  As a Malay, the plaintiff remains in the Islamic 
faith until her dying days [emphasis added].68 
The ruling was a clear exposition of the conflation of Malay 
racial and religious identity, both in the legal system and in the social 
imaginary of contemporary Malaysia, which, as we have seen, goes 
all the way back to the origins of the modern Malaysian state under 
British rule. Lina Joy suggests that the state’s extensive regulation of 
religion and race gave rise to festering legal conundrums.   
Lina Joy is widely understood as a freedom of religion case. In 
one sense, this is absolutely accurate. Joy was fighting for state 
recognition of her conversion. The case was understood as a freedom 
 
67. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119, 
132 (Malay.); MALAY. FED. CONST., art. 160.  
68. Lina Joy, [2004] 2 M.L.J. at 144.  
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of religion case by many in the Muslim community, too, although 
this camp viewed the case as a test of shariah court autonomy vis-à-
vis the civil courts in multi-religious Malaysia. Yet the source of 
repeated institutional friction was not merely the result of individual 
versus collectivist visions of “freedom of religion.” The cases were 
rooted in the institutional features of Malaysian judiciary. To gain 
further traction, it is worthwhile examining another landmark case 
that exposes the same institutional source of legal friction. 
III.  SHAMALA V. JAYAGANESH 
Shamala v. Jayaganesh69 is another case that commanded 
nation-wide attention. Shamala Sathiyaseelan and Jeyaganesh 
Mogarajah, both Hindus, were married in 1998 under the Marriage 
and Divorce Act, which governs family law for non-Muslims in 
Malaysia.70 They had two children, who were considered Hindu as a 
result of their parents’ religious status.71 Four years into their 
marriage, Jeyanganesh converted to Islam.72 Six days after his 
conversion, he registered their two children, ages two and three, as 
new converts to Islam without his wife’s knowledge or consent.73 
When Shamala learned of the development, she took the children to 
her parents’ home and filed a petition to secure their custody.74 
Shamala obtained an interim custody order from the civil courts, the 
appropriate legal body for adjudicating family law disputes among 
non-Muslims.75 But shortly thereafter, her husband secured an 
interim custody order of his own from a shariah court on the grounds 
that he and the children were now legally Muslim and therefore under 
the jurisdiction of the shariah courts in matters of family law.76 The 
two custody orders thus came to opposite conclusions over who had 
the right to take possession of the children, yet neither husband nor 
wife was able to contest the competing court order as the result of 
legal standing requirements.   
 
69. Shamala Sathiyaseelan v. Jeyaganesh C. Mogarajah, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 648 
(Malay.). 
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Shamala begged the question of which court had the ultimate 
authority to determine the religious status and the custody of the 
children. According to the law, the shariah courts have jurisdiction 
over personal status questions involving individuals who are legally 
registered as Muslim.77 Moreover, Article 121(1A) of the Federal 
Constitution prevents the civil courts from reviewing shariah court 
decisions.78 Yet it was undeniable that Shamala’s rights were harmed. 
Married to a Hindu according to civil law, she now found herself in a 
custody battle that involved the shariah courts. As with the Lina Joy, 
Shamala produced a political crisis and became a focal point for 
competing politicians and civil society groups, each rallying around 
the banner of “religious liberty.” The case provided the spark that 
ignited a full throttled campaign between liberal and conservative 
activists. 
Shamala’s attorney, Ravi Nekoo, made a concerted effort to 
attract public attention—an effort that was facilitated by the rapidly 
changing environment of civil society activism and digital media. 
Nekoo was an active member in the legal aid community, and he was 
well networked with a variety of rights organizations in Kuala 
Lumpur. Nekoo turned to the most prominent women’s rights groups 
in Kuala Lumpur: the Women’s Aid Organization, the All Women 
Action Movement, the Women’s Centre for Change, Sisters in Islam, 
and the Women Lawyers’ Association.79 He also turned to religious 
organizations, most notably the Hindu Sangam, the Catholic Lawyers 
Society, and the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, 
Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST).80 These 
groups took an immediate interest in the case and they quickly gained 
formal observer status with the High Court.81 Subsequently, they 
 
77. Id. at 660.  
78. Id. at 658. This is the standing interpretation provided by the Federal Court 
through case law.  In contrast, prominent liberal rights attorneys Malik Imtiaz and 
Shanmuga Kanesalingam maintain that, if properly read, Article 121(1A) should 
not preclude the civil courts from reviewing shariah court rulings when 
fundamental liberties are in jeopardy. They argue that the weakening of formal 
judicial independence made judges vulnerable to political pressures, particularly 
when they are working on politically sensitive cases. According to this view, the 
weak stance of the civil courts in cases involving Article 121(1A) is ultimately the 
result of political pressure and insufficient judicial independence rather than 
express constitutional provisions. Interview with Shanmuga Kanesalingam, in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malay. (July 9, 2009); Interview with Malik Imtiaz, in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malay. (Nov. 5, 2009). 
79. Telephone interview with Ravi Nekoo (Feb. 18, 2012).  
80. Id.  
81. Id. Malik Imtiaz also held a watching brief for the Malaysian Bar Council. 
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filed amicus curiae briefs and mobilized their resources to bring 
public attention to the case.82   
In the High Court proceedings that ensued, Shamala sought a 
court order declaring the conversions of the children null and void.83 
She claimed the equal right to decide the religion of the children and 
objected to the unilateral conversions. However, Judge Faiza Tamby 
Chik (the same judge who had issued the High Court ruling in Lina 
Joy) ruled that Article 12(4) of the Constitution provides that “the 
religion of a person under the age of 18 shall be decided by his parent 
or guardian.”84 Judge Faiza explained that the use of the singular—
“parent”—should be taken to mean that unilateral conversion of a 
minor, without the consent or even knowledge of the other parent, 
was legal.85  
Finding that the conversion of the children conformed to the law, 
Judge Faiza moved onto the question of whether Shamala could 
further challenge the new religious status of the children through the 
civil courts. Here, Judge Faiza relied upon Article 121(1A) of the 
Federal Constitution to argue that the civil courts did not have 
jurisdiction to consider the matter: 
I have come to the conclusion that by virtue of art. 
121(1A) of the Federal Constitution, the Shariah Court 
is the qualified forum to determine the status of the 
two minors.  Only the Shariah Court has the legal 
expertise in hukum syarak [shariah law] to determine 
whether the conversion of the two minors is valid or 
 
82. Id.  
83. Shamala Sathiyaseelan v. Jeyaganesh C. Mogarajah, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 648, 
652 (Malay.). 
84. Id. at 649. Judge Faiza, who had served as a language instructor before he 
began his legal career, devoted several pages of his ruling to explain the grammar 
and meaning of words in the singular and plural. According to Judge Faiza, we 
must accept the plain meaning of the word “parent” in Article 12(4) of the Federal 
Constitution. The article “uses the word ‘parent.’ It is spelt ‘p-a-r-e-n-t’ without the 
[letter] ‘s.’ It is used in the singular sense.” Id. at 655. 
85. Id. at 656. Other cases concerning the unilateral conversion of minors 
include Teoh Eng Huat v. Kadhi, Pasir Mas, Kelantan, [1990] 2 M.L.J. 300 
(Malay.); Subashini Rajasingam v. Saravanan Thangathoray, [2007] 4 M.L.J. 97 
(Malay.); Indira Gandhi v. Muhammad Riduan bin Abdullah, [2013] High Court of 
Malay. in Ipoh, available at http://www.loyarburok.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 
07/Indira-Gandhi-Lee-Swee-Seng-Judgment.pdf. 
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not.  Only the Shariah Court has the competency and 
expertise to determine the said issue.86 
 The ruling put Shamala in a no-win situation. She had no remedy 
in the civil courts nor did she have legal standing in the shariah courts 
because she was not a Muslim. Even if she had wished to approach 
the shariah courts for relief, it was not an avenue open to her. Judge 
Faiza acknowledged the unsatisfactory result:  “What then is for her 
to do? The answer [is that] it is not for this court to legislate and 
confer jurisdiction to the Civil Court but for Parliament to provide the 
remedy.”87 Fearing that her husband would deny her joint custody, 
Shamala moved to Australia with the children, never to return.88    
IV. TWO VIEWS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM  
As a direct result of the Shamala ruling in April 2004, liberal 
rights groups formed a coalition named “Article 11” after the article 
of the Federal Constitution guaranteeing freedom of religion. The 
coalition included such prominent organizations as the All Women’s 
Action Society (AWAM), the Bar Council of Malaysia, the National 
Human Rights Society (HAKAM), the Malaysian Civil Liberties 
Society, Sisters in Islam, Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM), and 
the Women’s Aid Organisation (WAO). The Article 11 Coalition also 
included the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, 
Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST), an 
umbrella organization representing the concerns of non-Muslim 
communities in Malaysia. The objective of the Article 11 coalition 
was to focus public attention on the erosion of individual rights and 
to “ensure that Malaysia does not become a theocratic state.”89 The 
Article 11 coalition produced a website, short documentary videos 
providing firsthand interviews with non-Muslims who were adversely 
affected by Article 121(1A), analysis and commentary from their 
attorneys, and recorded roundtables on the threat posed by Islamic 
law.90 The Article 11 coalition and the Malaysian Bar Council went 
 
86. Shamala Sathiyaseelan, [2004] 2 M.L.J. at 660.  
87. Id. at 659.  
88. Shamala attempted to appeal the ruling, but the Federal Court dismissed 
the appeal without considering the constitutional questions on the grounds that she 
was in contempt of court for denying Jeyaganesh his visitation rights. 
89. ARTICLE 11 COALITION, http://www.article11.org/ (last visited Mar. 2, 
2010).  The website has since been closed. 
90. See The Coalition Called Article 11: Myth and Facts, ALIRAN (Mar. 27, 
2007), http://aliran.com/aliran-monthly/2006/200611/the-coalition-called-article-
11-myths-and-facts/ (discussing how the Article 11 coalition has also sent an open 
500 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:481 
 
 
on to organize a series of public forums across Malaysia. The road 
show campaign was coupled with a petition to the Prime Minister, 
signed by 20,000 concerned Malaysians, calling on the government 
to affirm “Malaysia shall not become a theocratic state.”91 
It is not difficult to understand why the rulings roused deep 
concern for some. Each case provided a clear example that the civil 
courts were beginning to cede broad legal authority when issues 
around Islam were involved, even when it meant trampling on 
individual rights enshrined in the Federal Constitution and even when 
non-Muslims were involved. Within the broad context of the dakwah 
movement over the preceding three decades, liberal rights activists 
understood the rulings as the failure of this last bastion of secular 
law.   
However, these cases evoked the worst fears among 
conservatives as well. For conservatives, the cases were understood 
as an attack on the autonomy of the shariah courts. In the Lina Joy 
case, for example, the central focus of conservative discourse 
concerned the implications of an adverse ruling on the Muslim 
community’s ability to manage its own religious affairs in multi-
religious Malaysia. If the civil courts affirmed Joy’s individual right 
to freedom of religion, it would essentially constitute a breakdown in 
the autonomy of the shariah courts and a breach in the barrier that 
conservatives understood Article 121(1A) to guarantee.  
Conservative activists argued that human rights instruments are 
focused exclusively on the individual and, as such, they are unable to 
accommodate communal understandings of rights when they come in 
tension with individual rights claims.92 Prominent Islamic Party of 
Malaysia (PAS) Parliament Member Dzulkifli Ahmad lamented that 
liberal activists could view the cases only from an individual rights 
perspective and not see that such a framework necessarily 
undermines the collective right of the Muslim community to govern 
 
letter to the Prime Minister, organized public forums, and provided interviews and 
press releases).  
91. Id.; Open Letter: Reaffirming the Supremacy of the Federal Constitution, 
PETITION ONLINE, http://www.petitiononline.com/constsup/petition.html (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
92. This specific point was made by several prominent Islamic NGO leaders in 
personal interviews. Interview with Zaid Kamaruddin, Head of Jamaah Islah 
Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur, Malay. (June 25, 2009); Interview with Yusri 
Mohammad, Head of ABIM, in Kuala Lumpur, Malay. (June 30, 2009). 
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its own affairs.93 For Dzulkifli and others, adverse rulings in any of 
the cases involving Article 121(1A) would be tantamount to 
“abolishing and dismantling the Shariah Court.”94 For conservatives, 
individual rights talk is marked by an expansionist and even an 
“imperialist” orientation. Just as discourse among liberal rights 
activists is marked by fear that individual rights faced an imminent 
threat, a deep anxiety set in among those who wished to protect what 
they viewed as the collective rights of the Muslim community.   
Of course an understanding of the religious community as the 
legitimate bearer of rights obfuscates the issue of how religious 
authority was constructed in Malaysia in the first place. As we have 
seen, the legal dilemmas concerning the authority and jurisdiction of 
the shariah courts were not the result of an inherent or essential 
tension between the Islamic legal tradition and individual rights. 
Rather, these legal dilemmas were the result of the state’s specific 
formalization and institutionalization of state law. The bifurcation of 
the legal system into parallel jurisdictions had hard-wired the legal 
system to produce legal tensions. 
Liberal rights groups were not the only organizations to mobilize 
in the name of freedom of religion. A group of lawyers calling 
themselves Lawyers in Defense of Islam (Peguam Pembela Islam) 
held a press conference to announce their formation at the Federal 
Territories Shariah Court Building on July 13, 2006. Their explicit 
aim was to “take action to defend the position of Islam” in direct 
response to the activities of the Article 11 coalition. A few days later, 
a broad array of conservative Muslim NGOs united in a coalition 
calling itself Muslim Organizations for the Defense of Islam 
(Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pembela Islam), or Defenders (PEMBELA) 
for short. PEMBELA brought together over fifty Muslim 
organizations including ABIM, Jamaah Islah Malaysia (JIM), the 
Shariah Lawyers’ Association of Malaysia (PGSM), and the Muslim 
Professionals Forum. The founding statement for Pertubuhan-
Pertubuhan Pembela Islam explains that the immediate motivation 
for organizing were the Article 121(1A) cases which, in their view, 
challenged “the position of Islam in the Constitution and the legal 
system of this country.”95  
 
93. This view was summed up in the title of Dzulkifli Ahmed’s book on the 
topic, Blind Spot. DZULKIFLI AHMAD, BLIND SPOT: THE ISLAMIC STATE DEBATE, 
NEP, AND OTHER ISSUES (2007).  
94. Id. at 153. 
95. Press Release, PEMBELA, “Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pembela Islam 
Desak Masalah Murtad Ditangani Secara Serius” [Defenders of Islam Urge More 
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Conservative NGOs organized dozens of public forums and 
flooded the Malay language press with hundreds more articles and 
opinion pieces on the need to defend the autonomy of the shariah 
courts from outside interference. Demonstrating their grassroots 
support, PEMBELA submitted a 700,000-signature petition to the 
Prime Minister, dwarfing the 20,000 signatures that Article 11 
coalition was able to muster.  
Civil society groups fundamentally shaped popular 
understandings of what was at stake for the future of Malaysia.96 
Rather than understanding these conundrums as the result of 
Malaysian positive law and the institutional structure of the 
Malaysian judiciary, the vast majority of Malaysians came to 
understand the cases as reflecting inherent and unavoidable tensions 
of liberal rights versus Islamic law, individual rights versus collective 
rights, and secularism versus religion.  
V. THE PARADOX AND POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN 
MALAYSIA 
The political spectacle accompanying these cases exacerbated 
the dilemmas that attorneys, judges, and everyday citizens 
encountered in their efforts to maneuver through the Malaysian legal 
system. In the past, attorneys had found pragmatic ways of helping 
Malaysians change their official legal status, in spite of lacunas in the 
law. Malaysians had been able to secure state recognition of 
conversion by affirming a statutory declaration before a 
commissioner of oaths and registering a new name in the civil court 
registry through a deed poll.97 With these two documents, an 
individual could then secure a new identity card reflecting the name 
change, which signified one’s new, non-Muslim status.98 For most 
purposes, including marriage, one could then go on with life as one 
wished. The compartmentalization of different personal status laws 
 
Seriousness in Handling the Apostasy Problem] (July 17, 2006) (on file with 
author). 
96. For a more detailed examination of these dynamics, see Moustafa, supra 
note 62.  For more on lay understandings of Islamic law in Malaysia, see Tamir 
Moustafa, Islamic Law, Women’s Rights, and Popular Legal Consciousness in 
Malaysia, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 168 (2013). 
97. A statutory declaration is the equivalent of an affidavit. A deed poll is a 
legal statement to express an intention. 
98. Salbiah Ahmad, Islam in Malaysia: Constitutional and Human Rights 
Perspectives, 2 MUSLIM WORLD J.  HUM. RTS. 10–11 (2005). 
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for Muslims and non-Muslims and their entrenchment in parallel civil 
and shariah court jurisdictions still afforded workable solutions for 
individuals and couples attempting to negotiate their way between the 
two legal regimes.   
Early Article 121(1A) cases percolated up through the civil 
courts beginning soon after the 1988 constitutional amendment, but 
cases did not command popular attention until the Lina Joy and 
Shamala cases. Attorneys recount that, prior to Lina Joy and 
Shamala, shariah court judges had regularly facilitated the official 
recognition of conversion out of Islam when they were called upon.99 
But once the cases became a focal point of public debate, intense 
pressures engulfed both the shariah and the civil courts. This 
politicized environment made it difficult even for sympathetic shariah 
court judges to facilitate state recognition of conversion out of 
Islam.100 Likewise, intense political pressure made it difficult for civil 
court judges to adopt different interpretations of Article 121(1A) that 
might enable the civil courts to intervene when fundamental liberties 
were in jeopardy. Instead, the civil courts ceded authority to the 
shariah courts in virtually all the subsequent cases that involved the 
fact patterns of Lina Joy and Shamala.  
Shamala and Lina Joy underline some of the paradoxes, 
ambiguities, and indeterminacies of “religious freedom” that fuel a 
politics of religious freedom. The first and most apparent paradox is 
that both sides emphatically demanded freedom from state 
interference in religious life, yet both sides were also reliant on state 
power to enforce diametrically opposed visions of religious freedom. 
This apparent contradiction underlines the fact that both the concept 
of religious freedom and the politics of religious freedom are 
fundamentally rooted in the legal and judicial mechanisms of the 
modern state. Absent the power and reach of the modern state, there 
would be no strident debate over how to order and regulate society. A 
closer look at the origins of the cases further reveals that the legal 
conundrums are rooted in complex, interlocking dilemmas that 
involve the juridification of race and religion and competing state and 
federal jurisdictions, both of which were part of the state building 
process and both of which are direct legacies of the British colonial 
project. The fact that these dilemmas are interlocking, and each 
 
99. Interviews with Latheefa Koya and Fadiah Nadwa Fikri, Attorneys, in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malay. (June 29, 2009). 
100. This was true even for Chinese and Indian Malaysians who had converted 
to Islam for marriage, but wished to change their legal status back to their original 
faith after the death of a spouse or the failure of a marriage. 
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backed by entrenched political and economic interests, suggests that 
these quandaries are not going away anytime soon.  
Ironically, the tools and institutions that we instinctively turn to 
for justice—law and courts—are, in fact, principal sources of tension 
in the politics of religious liberty in Malaysia. Instead of resolving 
legal questions, the court system is hard-wired to produce legal 
controversies anew. Rather than simply arbitrate between contending 
parties, the courts exacerbate ideological cleavages.101 And instead of 
assuaging uncertainties, courts in Malaysia repeatedly instill a 
tremendous degree of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and anxiety around 
the meaning and content of “religious freedom.”  
 
101. As discussed, many of the civil society groups that had mobilized around 
Lina Joy formed as a direct result of the cases themselves. These include the Article 
11 Coalition, PEMBELA, and several of their constituent organizations.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 90, 95. 
